Nexon's Private/Public Key's

Nexon's public and private key's are one step closer to discovery.Here's a algorithm and some info.With these key's we can run are own lobby's/sign files the same way nexon does.ECDSA Param's are in there,im hoping to get a P.O.C going.....
.signature has problems, re-make with post SSLeay045.....SHA1

ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY...PRIVATE KEY.ANY PRIVATE KEY..................$...$.. $...........M...O......................@...`...
PEM part of OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009..0123456789ABCDEF....C:\src\buildtools\branch es\voon\tmp4x2fne\externals\openssl-0.9.8k\crypto\pem\pem_lib.c.phrase is too short, needs to be at least %d chars..Enter PEM pass phrase:..Proc-Type: 4,...BAD-TYPE....MIC-ONLY....MIC-CLEAR...ENCRYPTED...DEK-Info: ..PKCS #7 SIGNED DATA.TRUSTED CERTIFICATE.X509 CERTIFICATE....-----END ...-----...-----BEGIN .strlen(objstr)+23+2*enc->iv_len+13 <= sizeof buf....enc->iv_len <= (int)sizeof(iv)..Proc-Type: .Expecting: .X509_CRL....crl.X509_CRL_INFO...revoked.nextUpdat e..lastUpdate..issuer..X509_REVOKED....extensions. .revocationDate..serialNumber

CERTIFICATE.RSA PRIVATE KEY.RSA PUBLIC KEY..PUBLIC KEY..DSA PRIVATE KEY.DSA PARAMETERS..EC PARAMETERS...EC PRIVATE KEY..DH PARAMETERS...
md4WithRSAEncryption....RSA-MD4.
aes-256-cfb.AES-256-CFB.aes-256-ofb.AES-256-OFB.aes-256-cbc.aes-256-ecb.AES-256-ECB.aes-192-cfb.AES-192-CFB.aes-192-ofb.AES-192-OFB.aes-192-cbc.AES-192-CBC.aes-192-ecb.AES-192-ECB.aes-128-cfb.AES-128-CFB.aes-128-ofb.AES-128-OFB.aes-128-cbc.aes-128-ecb.AES-128-ECB.Microsoft CSP Name..CSPName.ecdsa-with-SHA1.prime256v1..prime239v3..prime239v2..prime239v 1..prime192v3..prime192v2..prime192v1..id-ecPublicKey..characteristic-two-field....prime-field.ANSI X9.62..ansi-X9-62..X509v3 No Revocation Available..

CERTIFICATE.RSA PRIVATE KEY.RSA PUBLIC KEY..PUBLIC KEY..DSA PRIVATE KEY.DSA PARAMETERS..EC PARAMETERS...EC PRIVATE KEY..DH PARAMETERS...memory buffer...

PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD...T........œ,................... ...............œ,.........‰...........lëK..B).‰... ........`ëK..B).........Ä=L.............x=L.Not After: .Not Before: ....decipherOnly....Decipher Only...encipherOnly....Encipher Only...cRLSign.CRL Sign....keyCertSign.Certificate Sign....keyAgreement....Key Agreement...dataEncipherment....Data Encipherment...keyEncipherment.Key Encipherment....nonRepudiation..Non Repudiation.digitalSignature....Digital Signature...objCA...Object Signing CA...emailCA.S/MIME CA...sslCA...SSL CA..reserved....Unused..objsign.Object Signing..server..client..G

%s%02X..%*sKey Id: .%*sAlias: %s....%*sNo Rejected Uses.....%*sRejected Uses:.%*s...%*sNo Trusted Uses......%*sTrusted Uses:.%*s....<EMPTY>.....%*s.%*s<Not Supported>..%*s<Parse Error>....%*s%s...: %s....%*s%s:..Generator (hybrid):.Generator (uncompressed):...Generator (compressed):.%s %s%lu (%s0x%lx)..%s 0.... recommended-private-length: %d bits.....generator:..prime:..Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (%d bit).....

PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY...PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN.PKCS7_ATTRIBUT ES....PKCS7_DIGEST....md..PKCS7_ENCRYPT...PKCS7_SI GN_ENVELOPE.PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT...PKCS7_RECIP_INFO.. ..enc_key.key_enc_algor...PKCS7_ENVELOPE..enc_data ....recipientinfo...PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL.serial ..PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO...unauth_attr.enc_digest..dige st_enc_alg..auth_attr...digest_alg..issuer_and_ser ial...PKCS7_SIGNED....signer_info.cert....contents ....md_algs.d.encrypted.d.digest....d.signed_and_e nveloped..d.enveloped.d.sign..d.data..d.other

DSA-Parameters: (%d bit)....coefficient:....exponent2:..exponent1:..pr ime2:.prime1:.privateExponent:....publicExponent:. Exponent:...modulus:....Modulus (%d bit):...Private-Key: (%d bit)...G: ...Q: ...P: ...pub: ...priv:...Seed:...Cofactor: ..Order: .B: ...A: ...Prime:..Polynomial:.Basis Type: %s..Field Type: %s..ASN1 OID: %s....ECDSA-Parameters: (%d bit)..X........=).................ðÉ,............. ............Œ........=).................ðÉ,....... ..................ì........=).................ðÉ,. àW,.....................

PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO.pkey....pkeyalg.........

11>...ENUMERATED..REAL....EXTERNAL....OBJECT DESCRIPTOR...OBJECT..OCTET STRING....BIT STRING..INTEGER.BOOLEAN.EOC.%-18s...%2d %-15s...(unknown)...<ASN1 %d>...appl [ %d ].cont [ %d ].priv [ %d ] ....prim: ..cons: ..length is greater than %ld..Error in encoding...BAD ENUMERATED..BAD INTEGER.00..%02X....[HEX DUMP]:.:%d.Bad boolean.....:BAD OBJECT.d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf ...d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ...%5ld:.... Public key OCSP hash: ..... Subject OCSP hash: .%02x%s... ... Signature Algorithm: ...Bad time value..%s %2d %02d:%02d:%02d %d%s.. GMT....X509v3 extensions...%12sUnknown Public Key:.....%12sEC Public Key:..%12sDSA Public Key:.....%12sRSA Public Key: (%d bit)....%12sUnable to load Public Key...%12sPublic Key Algorithm: .. Subject Public Key Info:.... Subject:%c... Not After : ... Not Before: .... Validity.... Issuer:%c...%8sSignature Algorithm: ....%02x%c...%12s%s. (Negative). %s%lu (%s0x%lx).... Serial Number:..%8sVersion: %lu (0x%lx)..... Data:...Certificate:....'()+,-./:=?.maxsize=....minsize=..............

PBE-MD2-DES PBE-MD5-DES
These algorithms were included in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification. They only offer 56 bits of protection since they both use DES.

PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 PBE-MD2-RC2-64 PBE-MD5-RC2-64 PBE-SHA1-DES
These algorithms are not mentioned in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification but they use the same key derivation algorithm and are supported by some software. They are mentioned in PKCS#5 v2.0. They use either 64 bit RC2 or 56 bit DES.

PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 PBE-SHA1-3DES PBE-SHA1-2DES PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 PBE-SHA1-RC2-40
These algorithms use the PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithm and allow strong encryption algorithms like triple DES or 128 bit RC2 to be used.

Here is the read key command for openssl

Read a DER unencrypted PKCS#8 format private key:

openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -nocrypt -in key.der -out key.pem

Edit:There's still the Verisign problem also,unless someone happen's to find valid cert's somehow.

Edit2:Verisign has been hacked before,and im pretty sure this hash exploit is still out there that would let us generate %100 valid cert's.

http://www.computerworld.com/s/artic...ring_Web_sites

Well first of all how do you think nexon does pming and thing's like that.....The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Public Key
It is also possible to use Diffie–Hellman as part of a public key infrastructure. Alice's public key is simply (ga,g,p). To send her a message Bob chooses a random b, and then sends Alice gb (un-encrypted) together with the message encrypted with symmetric key (ga)b. Only Alice can decrypt the message because only she has a. A preshared public key also prevents man-in-the-middle attacks.
In practice, Diffie–Hellman is not used in this way, with RSA being the dominant public key algorithm. This is largely for historical and commercial reasons, namely that RSA created a Certificate Authority that became Verisign. Diffie–Hellman cannot be used to sign certificates, although the ElGamal and DSA signature algorithms are related to it. However, it is related to MQV, STS and the IKE component of the IPsec protocol suite for securing Internet Protocol communications.

This is not leached.This is an ECDSA fail.I also have the login token if anyone is interested.

This is how long the PKEY is usage period,self explanatory

PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD...T........œ,................... ...............œ,.........‰...........lëK..B).‰... ........`ëK..B).........Ä=L.............x=L.Not After: .Not Before: ....decipherOnly....Decipher Only...encipherOnly....Encipher Only...cRLSign.CRL Sign....keyCertSign.Certificate Sign....keyAgreement....Key Agreement...dataEncipherment....Data Encipherment...keyEncipherment.Key Encipherment....nonRepudiation..Non Repudiation.digitalSignature....Digital Signature...objCA...Object Signing CA...emailCA.S/MIME CA...sslCA...SSL CA..reserved....Unused..objsign.Object Signing..server..client..G

Oh and btw look at the memory buffer here.

CERTIFICATE.RSA PRIVATE KEY.RSA PUBLIC KEY..PUBLIC KEY..DSA PRIVATE KEY.DSA PARAMETERS..EC PARAMETERS...EC PRIVATE KEY..DH PARAMETERS...memory buffer...

^

You will notice ECDSA-PARAMETERS from the blurb above
ECDSA-Parameters: (%d bit)..X........=).................ðÉ,............. ............Œ........=).................ðÉ,....... ..................ì........=).................ðÉ,. àW,.....................

And here it check's if it's revoked,

revoked.nextUpdat e..lastUpdate..issuer..X509_REVOKED....extensions. .revocationDate..serialNumber

The end goal is to sign are own content, as you can see below

PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY...PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN.PKCS7_ATTRIBUT ES....PKCS7_DIGEST....md..PKCS7_ENCRYPT...PKCS7_SI GN_ENVELOPE.PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT...PKCS7_RECIP_INFO.. ..enc_key.key_enc_algor...PKCS7_ENVELOPE..enc_data ....recipientinfo...PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL.serial ..PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO...unauth_attr.enc_digest..dige st_enc_alg..auth_attr...digest_alg..issuer_and_ser ial...PKCS7_SIGNED....signer_info.cert....contents ....md_algs.d.encrypted.d.digest....d.signed_and_e nveloped..d.enveloped.d.sign..d.data..d.other

Nexon's Private/Public Key's

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